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Matching and Anonymity∗
C. D. Aliprantis, G. Camera, and D. Puzzello
Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907–2056, USA
ABSTRACT: This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of deterministic bilateral
matching processes and studies systematically their properties. In particular, it formalizes a link
between matching and informational constraints by developing a notion of anonymity that is based
on the agents’ matching histories. It also explains why and how various matching processes generate
different degrees of “informational isolation” in the economy. We illustrate the usefulness of our
approach to modeling matching frameworks by discussing the classical turnpike model of Townsend.
Keywords and Phrases: Bilateral matching, frictions, anonymous trading, spatial interactions
JEL Classification Numbers: C78, E00
1 Introduction
A large segment of economics is concerned with the study of allocations when markets are
not functioning well. Market frictions are often seen as involving scarcity of information
or geographical separation or inadequate institutions, and have been modeled in a variety
of ways. A well-established research program has made these frictions explicit motivating
their presence by modeling trade as occurring in small groups, often pairwise matches.
The central assumption is that some technology exists that exogenously selects agents
from the population and matches them together.1
∗This research is supported in part by the NSF grants EIA-0075506, SES-0128039, DMS-0437210, and
ACI-0325846. We thank two anonymous referees for constructive comments that improved the exposition
of the paper. We also thank the participants in seminars at the University of Aarhus, Purdue University,
University of Texas at Austin, and at the XI Meeting on Real Analysis and Measure Theory in 2004,
the spring 2004 Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, the summer 2004 North American and European
Econometric Society meetings.
1 We interpret a technology broadly as a process that transforms or rearranges some “input” (the
population) into some “output” (spatially separated matches). Our use of the word technology is similar in
spirit to that of other scholars, for example see the “market technology” of Hahn [14] , the “communication
technology” of Townsend [26], or the “enforcement technology” of Kocherlakota [19].
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Matching frameworks have been used to answer basic questions in a variety of settings.
For instance, how market frictions affect equilibrium output and unemployment, as in [8],
the cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction, as in [22], or the relative value of
currencies in an international setting, as in [6]. A limitation of these frameworks is that
the matching technology is superficially formalized and mostly descriptive. One is often
confronted with hazy explanations as to how (and to what extent) the assumed frictions
are an implication of the mechanism by which agents interact with each other. In short,
a unifying theoretical structure is missing. This prevents a clear understanding of the
exact connection between the constraints imposed by the meeting technology, the types
of obstacles faced by market participants, the trades they can execute or the information
they can access, and the possible allocations. A more structured formalization of these
links can improve the formulation of models whose central trait is markets with impaired
functioning. Indeed, a comprehensive theory of exchange should clarify how the constraints
assumed to be in place originate from the underlying physical environment.
In this paper, we take a step toward advancing the theoretical foundations of matching
frameworks by considering physical environments with technologies that exogenously pair
agents deterministically. The major contributions are the development of an explicit set-
theoretic representation of bilateral matching technologies and the formalization of their
method of operation. We describe different matching processes and explain how they can
facilitate (or obstruct) the interactions among agents. Especially, we focus on the infor-
mational aspects since matching frameworks are used to motivate the existence of spatial
separation as well as more general obstacles to information flows.2 Indeed, we introduce a
map between properties of the matching process and the degrees of informational openness
(that is, the degrees of anonymity) that are consistent with the physical description of the
environment.
Our work complements two strands of literature that concern matching environments.
One strand includes a growing research on network games and network formation (for
a survey see [16]), a line of work dealing with endogenous matching and its allocative
consequences, as in [12] and [23] to cite a few, and recent efforts on endogenizing matching
frictions and “matching functions” in models with spatially separated agents, as in [21].
A second strand of literature comprises research directed at building solid mathematical
foundations for random matching models; examples include studies on random meetings
between agents drawn from countable or uncountable populations, as in [3], [11], or [2],
and work on the exact law of large numbers for random pairwise matching, [9] and [10].
This paper—that focuses on exogenous matchings and abstracts from their allocative
implications—is more closely related to this second strand of literature. However, our
approach differs from the foundations of matching studies cited above in that we remove
2 Examples include studies of the role of money in differential information economies, as in [15], the
sustainability of credit when agents are matched repeatedly, as in [7], and cooperation when agents change
their partners over time, as in [17].
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all stochastic elements. We can thus offer a basic conceptual framework that complements
both strands of literature not only by contributing to developing a common language and
basic notions for the mechanics of matching, but also by allowing us to explore some links
between matching dynamics and possible information flows.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we familiarize the reader with our
notation. Then, in Section 3 we describe the technical procedure that we use to pair
agents in any population, during a single period. To do so we define a notion of matching
technology—which we call a bilateral matching rule—and then present a theorem that
establishes the structure of matching on any population. Subsequently, in Section 4,
we discuss matching over time—as a sequence of matching rules—and then characterize
matching processes according to the levels of informational isolation they impose on the
economy. To do so, we develop a taxonomy of anonymity that is based on the agents’
matching histories. Then, in Section 5, we demonstrate how to construct economies where
the matching process provides each agent with an infinite sequence of deterministic pair-
ings, while imposing an extreme degree of informational isolation. Finally, in Section 6 we
offer some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
If A is any set, then the symbol |A| denotes the cardinality of A. As usual, |A| = ℵ0 means
that A is a countable set and |A| = c indicates that the cardinality of A is the continuum.
If a set A is a union of a pairwise disjoint family of sets {Ai}i∈I , i.e., A =
⋃
i∈I Ai and
Ai ∩ Aj = 6© if i 6= j, then we denote this by the symbol A =
⊔
i∈I Ai. Throughout the
paper we denote by X a non-empty set representing the population in the economy. We
assume these agents are infinitely lived and time is discrete.
3 Bilateral Matching Rules
In this section, we study how to pair agents in a period. Naturally, the first step we
must take is to formalize a general notion of a pairwise matching technology. To do so we
introduce the concept of bilateral matching rule.
Definition 1. A bilateral matching rule for the population X is a function φ : X → X
satisfying φ2(x) = x for all x ∈ X, i.e., φ2 = I, the identity mapping on X.
According to the above definition, if φ : X → X is a bilateral matching rule, then the
function φ is invertible—and so φ is a permutation of X since φ is a surjective function
that is also one-to-one. However, φ belongs to the special class of permutations whose
inverses coincide with themselves, i.e., φ−1 = φ; these functions are known in mathematics
as “involutions.” This simply says that any way of pairing agents in the population must
be such that the partner of an agent’s partner is the agent himself.
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Thus, if φ is a matching rule and agent x is matched to agent φ(x), then we call φ(x)
the partner of x. Symmetrically, x = φ
(
φ(x)
)
is the partner of φ(x) so that we can call
the set {x, φ(x)} a match. For concreteness, we think of matches as distinct pairs of
agents that are spatially separated.
Here are two simple examples of matching rules.
a. Let X = N = {1, 2, . . .}, the set of natural numbers, and define φ : X → X by
φ(2a) = 2a− 1 and φ(2a− 1) = 2a .
b. Let X = (0,∞) and define φ : X → X by φ(x) = 1x .
Of course, a trivial bilateral matching rule is the identity mapping of X, that is,
φ(x) = x for all x ∈ X, a case in which agents are basically unmatched (they are matched
to themselves). For this reason we provide the following definition of a technology that
pairs every agent to some other agent.
Definition 2. A bilateral matching rule φ : X → X is said to be exhaustive if φ(x) 6= x
holds for all agents x ∈ X, i.e., whenever no agent is matched under φ to herself.
Thus, we see that the matching rule in example (a) above is exhaustive, but it is not
in example (b), because we have the fixed point x = 1. Having introduced a notion of
matching technology, we now wish to establish not only the feasibility of bilateral matching
on any population X, but also the structure of matching. This is done in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. If φ : X → X is a bilateral matching rule, then there exist three pairwise
disjoint subsets A, B, and C of X such that:
1. X = A unionsqB unionsq C.
2. φ(a) = a for each a ∈ A.
3. φ(B) = C (or, equivalently, φ(C) = B).
Proof. Let φ : X → X be a bilateral matching rule. Assume first that φ is exhaustive.
So, in this case A = 6©. We shall establish the existence of the sets B and C using Zorn’s
lemma (a rigorous discussion of Zorn’s Lemma is in [13]).
To this end, let C denote the collection of all non-empty subsets B of X such that
B ∩ φ(B) = 6©. Notice that for each x ∈ X the set B = {x} belongs to C. Indeed,
if B ∩ φ(B) = {x} ∩ {φ(x)} 6= 6©, then x = φ(x), which contradicts the fact that φ is
exhaustive. Clearly the set C is partially ordered by the inclusion relation ⊇.
Next, we claim that the partially ordered set C satisfies the condition of Zorn’s lemma.
That is, we claim that every chain of C has an upper bound in C. To see this, let {Bj}j∈J
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be a chain of C, that is, for any pair of indices i, j ∈ J we either have Bi ⊇ Bj or Bj ⊇ Bi.
Let B =
⋃
j∈J Bj , and we claim that B ∈ C. To establish this claim, assume by way
of contradiction that B ∩ φ(B) 6= 6©. Fix some b ∈ B ∩ φ(B) and let a ∈ B be such
that b = φ(a). Choose i, j ∈ J such that a ∈ Bi and b ∈ Bj . Since either Bi ⊇ Bj or
Bj ⊇ Bi is true, we can assume without loss of generality that a, b ∈ Bj . In particular,
we have b = φ(a) ∈ Bj ∩ φ(Bj) = 6©, which is impossible. This contradiction shows that
B ∩ φ(B) = 6©, and so B ∈ C.
According to Zorn’s lemma there exists a maximal element in C, say B∗. We claim that
B∗ unionsq φ(B∗) = X. To see this, assume by way of contradiction that B∗ unionsq φ(B∗) 6= X. So,
there exists some x ∈ X such that x /∈ B∗ unionsq φ(B∗). Now consider the set B′ = B∗ ∪ {x}.
Clearly, the set B′ properly contains B∗ and we claim that B′ ∩ φ(B′) = 6©. Indeed, if
y ∈ B′ ∩ φ(B′) = [B∗ ∪ {x}] ∩ [φ(B∗) ∪ {φ(x)}] = B∗ ∩ {φ(x)} ,
then we have y = φ(x) ∈ B∗. This implies, x = φ(φ(x)) = φ(y) ∈ φ(B∗), contrary to
x /∈ B∗unionsqφ(B∗). Thus, B′∩φ(B′) = 6© must be the case, which contradicts the maximality
property of the set B∗. Therefore, B∗ unionsq φ(B∗) = X. This shows that in this case the
desired conclusion is true with A = 6©, B = B∗, and C = φ(B∗).
Now consider the general case. That is, assume that φ : X → X is an arbitrary bilateral
matching rule.
Let A = {x ∈ X : φ(x) = x} and put X1 = X \ A. If x ∈ X1, then notice that
φ(x) ∈ X1. Otherwise, φ(x) ∈ A implies x = φ2(x) = φ
(
φ(x)
)
= φ(x) or x ∈ A, which is
impossible. It follows that φ : X1 → X1 is an exhaustive bilateral matching rule, and so by
the previous part there exist two disjoint sets B and C with B unionsq C = X1 and φ(B) = C.
Now notice that the sets A, B, and C satisfy the desired properties.
In short, Theorem 3 establishes that—given any matching technology—we can always
match the population X in the following way. First, delete the set A of fixed points of
φ from the set X. The agents in A are unmatched, and we pair everyone in the set
X \A. Indeed, the theorem establishes that X \A can be divided into two sets B and C
having the same cardinality, which is why we can have φ map B onto C. For instance, in
example (b) above we can have A = {1}, B = (0, 1) and C = (1,∞). Clearly, the partition
X = AunionsqB unionsqC is not unique, since B and C need not be uniquely determined (unlike the
set A). For instance, we can have A = {1}, B = (0, 12]unionsq (1, 2) and C = (12 , 1)unionsq [2,∞). In
either case |B| = |C|.
Theorem 3 also tells us how—given any population—one can construct bilateral match-
ing rules on X. It involves two steps. First we must select a partition X = A unionsq B unionsq C
such that |B| = |C|. That is, we select who is to remain unmatched. Then, we can select
a permutation φ : B unionsqC → B unionsqC such that φ−1 = φ, and we use the identity function on
the set A. For example, if our population is X = [0, 1], then we can partition it using the
sets A =
[
1
2 ,
3
4
]
, B =
[
0, 12
)
, and C =
(
3
4 , 1
]
. If we take any permutation f : B → C, then
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the function φ : X → X, defined by
φ(x) =

x if x ∈ A
f(x) if x ∈ B
f−1(x) if x ∈ C ,
is a bilateral matching rule for the population X.
Of course, it may be impossible to pair everyone to someone else. The obvious case is
that of a finite population with an odd number of agents. The following lemma expands
on this a bit.
Lemma 4. For a set of agents X we have the following.
1. If X is a finite set with an odd number of agents, then X does not admit any
exhaustive bilateral matching rule.
2. If X is a non-empty compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex space, then
X does not admit any continuous exhaustive bilateral matching rule.
Proof. (1) Assume that X is a finite set with an odd number of agents and let φ : X → X
be a bilateral matching rule. If X = AunionsqBunionsqC is a partition with respect to φ, as described
in Theorem 3, then we have |X| = |A|+|B|+|C| = |A|+2|B|. Since |X| is an odd number,
we get |A| 6= 0, so φ cannot be an exhaustive bilateral matching rule.
(2) If X is a non-empty compact convex subset of some Hausdorff locally convex space,
then according to the Brouwer–Schauder–Tychonoff fixed point theorem every continuous
function φ : X → X must have a fixed point; see [1, Corollary 16.52, p. 550].
Now that we have formalized bilateral matching in a period, we move on to discussing
the mechanics of matching over time.
4 Bilateral Matching Processes
We start by formalizing a general notion of bilateral matching over time. To do so we
introduce the concept of a bilateral matching process.
Definition 5. A bilateral matching process on a population X, a matching process
for short, is a sequence Φ = (φ0, φ1, φ2, . . .) such that:
a. For each t ≥ 1 the function φt : X → X is a bilateral matching rule for X.
b. The function φ0 : X → X is the identity mapping, i.e., φ0(x) = x for each x ∈ X.
The agent φt(x) is called the partner of agent x and x is the partner of φt(x) in period t.
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For convenience, it is assumed that agents do not know the matching process but
they are familiar with its properties.3 Also, we interpret t = 0 as an initial date before
the matching process starts in period t = 1. Of course, this does not imply that a
bilateral matching process necessarily pairs every agent to someone else at every date
t ≥ 1. However, this is often assumed for practical purposes (see, for instance, [25]), in
which case we the say the matching process Φ is exhaustive.
As noted earlier, bilateral matching frameworks are often used to motivate the existence
of obstacles to trade or information flows. It is this second aspect that we are mostly
interested in studying, now that we have a sequence of matches. In short, we want to
characterize the possible interactions among agents, for a given matching process. To this
end, it may be helpful to think of matches as spatially separated encounters. This simply
means that agents can directly interact only within matches. For concreteness, suppose
that agents in a match observe their respective identities and can voluntarily exchange any
information on past matches that is available to them. That is, although agents cannot
observe any information related to matches in which they were not directly involved, they
can exploit their partners to indirectly acquire or relay this information to someone else. 4
Naturally, to discuss information flows we need to formalize the type of experience—
direct or indirect—that agents may have of past matches. This depends on the agents’
history of encounters generated by the matching process Φ. For this reason we start by
defining the following concepts. Consider an agent a ∈ X. For each t ≥ 0 we denote by
Pt(a) the set of all partners of a in periods up to and including period t. That is,
Pt(a) = {φ0(a), φ1(a), φ2(a), ..., φt(a)} .
Since φ0(a) = a we have P0(a) = {a}, hence a ∈ Pt(a) holds for all t ≥ 0 and all a ∈ X.
We now can introduce some terminology that we will later exploit to describe the
possible interactions among agents.
Definition 6. We say that two agents a and b:
1. Share a common partner, if there exist periods t1 < t2 < t3 and an agent c different
than a and b such that:
φt1(a) = b ,
φt2(b) = c ,
φt3(c) = a .
3 As a referee points out, it could be argued that if the agents do not have complete knowledge of the
matching process, then from their point of view the matching process need not be deterministic.
4 Of course this information-exchange process need not be voluntary— as in [19] where “societal mem-
ory” allows information to flow effortlessly and unimpeded. Also, we emphasize that observability of
identities is not needed for our results. It is assumed to stress how obstacles to information exchange are
independent of the knowledge of identities but rather hinge on the matching process.
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2. Share an indirect partner, if there exist periods t1 < t2 < t3 < · · · < tk and agents
a1, a2, . . . , ak−2 different than a and b, where k ≥ 4 such that:
φt1(a) = b ,
φt2(b) = a1 ,
φt3(a1) = a2 ,
...
φtk−1(ak−3) = ak−2 ,
φtk(ak−2) = a .
This helps us define the way in which information (or other economic resources) may
flow across agents, over time. For example, suppose a and b meet, at some date. Keep in
mind that matches are spatially separated, so that agents belonging to different matches
at a date t cannot communicate. Now suppose b wants to transfer information to a after
the match breaks. This is possible if a meets c, after b has met both a and c. In this
case b and a share the common partner c; she can transfer information from b to a after
their match has ended. Of course, this does not mean that c will necessarily communicate
something about b to agent a, when the two meet. It simply means this information
transfer is possible.
Communication from b to a can also take place via a sequence of matches, by means of
the indirect partner ak−2 of agent b. Here, a meets ak−2. Although agent ak−2 has never
met b, she has met someone who was in (direct or indirect) contact with b.
At this point it should be clear that to formalize the possible information flows we
must keep track not only of the matchings of an agent’s common partners but also of
her indirect partners, and so on. To do so we introduce some general notation, drawing
from [19]. Specifically, we denote by Πt(a) the set of all of a’s past and current partners
(including a herself), the past partners of a’s current partner, the partners that a’s partner
in period t−1 met until period t−2, and so on. This set of agents is given by the recursive
formula
Π0(a) = P0(a) = {a} , and Πt(a) = Πt−1(a)
⋃
Πt−1
(
φt(a)
)
for t = 1, 2, . . . .
From the above and an easy inductive argument it follows that Πt(a) is a finite set since
it includes a finite set of dates and partners. In particular, we note that Πt(a) does not
include the agents that a’s partners have met after meeting a and until the current period
t. Also, it should be clear that Pt(a) ⊆ Πt(a) holds for all a ∈ X and all t ≥ 0.
We now have all the necessary machinery to characterize the information that can
be made available to agents in a match. We do so by defining an exact map between
properties of the matching technology and the degrees of informational isolation that are
consistent with the physical description of the environment. In this way we are able to
formalize a general notion of anonymity in terms of the matching process in place.
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Definition 7. A bilateral matching process Φ on a population X is said to be:
1. Eventually weakly anonymous, if for each agent a there exists a period t (depending
on a) such that:
(a) the partners of a after period t are all distinct, and
(b) Pt(a) ∩ {φt+1(a), φt+2(a), . . .} ⊆ {a} .
2. Weakly anonymous, if for each agent a and each t 6= τ with φt(a) 6= a we have
φt(a) 6= φτ (a) .
3. Anonymous, if for each agent a that satisfies φt+1(a) 6= a in some period t ≥ 1 we
have
Pt(a) ∩ Pt
(
φt+1(a)
)
= 6© .
4. Strongly anonymous, if for each agent a that satisfies φt+1(a) 6= a in some period
t ≥ 1 we have
Πt(a) ∩Πt
(
φt+1(a)
)
= 6© .
Our notion of anonymity is developed as follows. First, we formalize a matching process
Φ on the population X. Given Φ, we can then trace every agent’s matching history, i.e.,
we can define a precise map between the matching process and the information (about
past matches) that is potentially available to him at each date. The degree of anonymity
that can result in the economy is then measured by comparing the information sets of
matched agents. Thus, different matching processes imply various degrees of anonymity,
i.e., various levels of informational isolation in the economy.
In a model with eventually weak anonymity, enduring relationships are possible but
they will eventually break down without the possibility to be reconstituted. For example,
this type of matching is very common in the job-search literature (where ongoing worker-
firm matches are randomly terminated, as in [22]) as well as in other contexts (as in the
study of markets with decentralized price formation processes of [5]).
Weakly anonymous matching processes rule out the possibility of ongoing relationships.
In short, no two agents can directly interact with each other over time since a match
between a and b lasts only one period, after which a will never meet b again. Technically,
in every t ≥ 1 and for each a we have φt+1(a) /∈ Pt(a). Matching processes with this
property have been commonly adopted in some monetary models (e.g., [18]). The reason
is that weak anonymity impedes direct credit arrangements (such as the direct redemption
of IOUs). This is taken to be a sufficient justification for the use of money in the process
of exchange, since current sales cannot be based on future direct repayment.
However, under weak anonymity the door is open to the possibility that a and b,
although never meeting again, may share a common partner c. Stronger degrees of
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anonymity progressively remove all direct and indirect links, past and future, between
agents, as we demonstrate next.
Lemma 8. If the bilateral matching process Φ on the population X is:
a. anonymous, then no pair of agents will share any common partner over their life-
times.
b. strongly anonymous, then no pair of agents will share any common or indirect partner
over their lifetimes.
Proof. (a) Let Φ be an anonymous bilateral matching process and assume by way of
contradiction that two agents a and b share a common partner. This means that there
exist three periods t1 < t2 < t3 and an agent c such that:
(i) φt1(a) = b, (ii) φt2(b) = c, and (iii) φt3(c) = a .
Clearly, we have
t1 < t2 ≤ t3 − 1 . (?)
Now note that (iii) yields a = φt3(c) = φ(t3−1)+1(c) 6= c and so by the anonymity of Φ,
we get Pt3−1(c) ∩ Pt3−1(φ(t3−1)+1(c)) = 6© or
Pt3−1(c) ∩ Pt3−1(a) = 6© . (??)
Using (ii) we obtain b = φt2(c) and a glance at (?) guarantees that b ∈ Pt3−1(c). Next,
observe that (i) in conjunction with (?) implies b ∈ Pt3−1(a). So b ∈ Pt3−1(c) ∩ Pt3−1(a)
contrary to (??). This contradiction establishes the validity of (a).
(b) Assume that Φ is a strongly anonymous bilateral matching process and suppose first
by way of contradiction that two agents a and b share an indirect partner. This means
that there exist periods t1 < t2 < t3 < · · · < tk and agents a1, a2, . . . , ak−2 different than
a and b, where k ≥ 4 such that:
φt1(a) = b ,
φt2(b) = a1 ,
φt3(a1) = a2 ,
...
φtk−1(ak−3) = ak−2 ,
φtk(ak−2) = a .
Clearly, we have
t1 < t2 < t3 < · · · < tk−1 ≤ tk − 1 . (†)
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From a = φtk(ak−2) = φ(tk−1)+1(ak−2) 6= ak−2 and the strong anonymity of Φ, it
follows that Πtk−1(ak−2) ∩Πtk−1(φ(tk−1)+1(ak−2)) = 6© or
Πtk−1(ak−2) ∩Πtk−1(a) = 6© . (††)
Now note that ak−2 ∈ Πtk−1(ak−2) is trivially true. On the other hand, it is not
difficult to see that ak−2 ∈ Πtk−1(a). But then we have ak−2 ∈ Πtk−1(ak−2) ∩ Πtk−1(a),
contrary to (††).
Finally, to establish that no pair of agents share a common partner in their life times,
use part (a) in conjunction with the fact that strong anonymity implies anonymity. (See
also the proof of Lemma 9.)
Lemma 8 states that in an anonymous matching process any two agents a and b cannot
interact over time by means of a common partner c. However, a possibility still exists that
a and b may share some experience of past events by means of an indirect partner d. For
example, the matching process assumed in the Turnpike model of Townsend [25] has this
property (we work this out explicitly later on).
To rule out any possibility of information sharing we need a strongly anonymous match-
ing process. Our formulation reflects an assumption found in [19] (assumption (A2)), which
imposes the most severe restriction on information flows among agents. It rules out the
possibility that an arbitrary agent a may meet former partners or anyone who has been
in direct or indirect contact with any of a’s former partners. In short, strong anonymity
imposes a restriction on the pattern of matching that insures total information isolation
in every meeting.
Strong anonymity is clearly a feature of the overlapping generations model of Samuel-
son [24]—which can be interpreted as a deterministic matching model—since the agents
live for two periods. Although we do not know of any infinitely-lived agent models that
make strong anonymity an explicit feature of the physical environment, similarly severe
informational frictions seem to be implicitly assumed in many models. Such assumptions
are usually motivated by the presence of spatial separation, random meetings and inability
to recognize the partners’ features (identities, etc). 5 Of course, our formalization demon-
strates these justifications are unnecessary to achieve informational isolation. While this
is perhaps obvious, it is certainly less obvious whether any strongly anonymous matching
process in fact exists. For this reason, we devote Section 5 to demonstrating a general
method for constructing a deterministic matching process that insures complete informa-
tional isolation. Before doing so, however, it may be helpful to discuss the relationship
between different degrees of anonymity and to provide an example, by characterizing a
well-known deterministic matching model.
5 For instance see the work [20] on long-term exchange relationships and anonymous market exchange
as well as several recent monetary models such as [4].
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4.1 Order of Implications of Anonymity
We start by discussing the order of implications.
Lemma 9. We have the following implications:
Strong Anonymity =⇒ Anonymity
=⇒ Weak Anonymity
=⇒ Eventual Weak Anonymity
In general, no reverse implication is true.
Proof. Let Φ = (φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3, . . .) be a bilateral matching process on a set of agents X
and fix some agent a ∈ X.
Assume first that Φ is strongly anonymous. If φt+1(a) 6= a, then from
Pt(a) ∩ Pt
(
φt+1(a)
) ⊆ Πt(a) ∩Πt(φt+1(a)) = 6© ,
it follows that Pt(a) ∩ Pt
(
φt+1(a)
)
= 6©. This shows that Φ is an anonymous bilateral
matching process.
Now suppose that Φ is anonymous. Assume by way of contradiction that for some
1 ≤ t < τ and some agent a we have φt(a) 6= a and φt(a) = φτ (a). Let t∗ = τ − 1
and b = φt∗+1(a) = φτ (a) 6= a. Clearly, t ≤ t∗. Now note that b ∈ Pt∗(b) and that
b = φτ (a) = φt(a) ∈ Pt∗(a), contrary to Pt∗(a) ∩ Pt∗(b) = 6©. This contradiction shows
that anonymity implies weak anonymity.
The fact that weak anonymity implies eventual weak anonymity is obvious. To see
that no reverse implication holds true, see the example in Section 4.2.
As expected, the more restrictive anonymity subsumes a less restrictive one. In general,
although the opposite implication is not true, there are cases in which less restrictive
anonymity implies more stringent anonymity. For example divide a population into two
sets with the same cardinality and call them “sellers” and “buyers.” In each period match
every seller to a different buyer, i.e., impose weak anonymity. This yields anonymity since
the agents cannot share any common partner as sellers only meet buyers (and vice-versa).
More specifically,
Lemma 10. Let Φ be a weakly anonymous matching process on X. Assume that there
exists a partition X = BunionsqC of X such that φt(B) = C for each t ≥ 1. Then the matching
process Φ is anonymous.
Proof. By symmetry we have φt(C) = B for each t ≥ 1. This implies φt is an exhaustive
matching rule for each t ≥ 1. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists some a
such that Pt(a)∩Pt(b) 6= 6© holds true for some t ≥ 1, where b = φt+1(a). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that a ∈ B; and so b = φt+1(a) ∈ C. Clearly, b 6= a.
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Since φt(a) ∈ C, φt(b) ∈ B and B∩C = 6©, it follows from Pt(a) = {a, φ1(a), . . . , φt(a)},
Pt(b) = {b, φ1(b), . . . , φt(b)}, and Pt(a) ∩ Pt(b) 6= 6© that there exists some 1 ≤ τ ≤ t such
that either a = φτ (b) or b = φτ (a). In either case, we have φτ (a) = b = φt+1(a). However,
the latter conclusion contradicts the weak anonymity of Φ. Thus, Φ is anonymous.
At this point we are ready for an example.
4.2 An Example: Anonymity in Townsend’s Turnpike
Townsend [25] proposes a model where agents undergo an infinite deterministic sequence of
bilateral matches. This model is often used in monetary theory and has been adapted and
exploited in experimental economics, as its structure restricts substantially the interactions
that are possible among agents. Here, we demonstrate that the scope of these restrictions
is limited, in that the matching process is anonymous but not strongly so.
The model has countably many agents. We can interpret this economy as having
countably many spatially separated trading posts located at the integer points along the
real line. Each agent is assumed to be located into one of the countably many of trading
posts. The bilateral matching process is such that “any two agents are paired at most
once during their lifetimes” (i.e., it satisfies weak anonymity), and “they share no common
third agent as a trading partner” (i.e., it satisfies anonymity). In each period every agent
travels on a line (the ‘turnpike’), either east or west, moving by one position (see [25]
for an illustration) so that every trading post has two agents, called “odd” and “even,”
depending on the direction in which they move.
Define the population by X = Z \ {0} = {. . . ,−2,−1, 1, 2, . . .}, i.e., the set of integers
deprived of the zero. Without loss of generality we can identify the west-moving agents
with even numbers and the others with odd numbers. The exhaustive bilateral matching
process Φ is defined as follows. We let φ0 = I. Now let B = {. . . ,−4,−2, 2, 4, . . .}, the set
of all even integers, and C = {. . . ,−3,−1, 1, 3, . . .}, the set of all odd integers. For t ≥ 1
the matching rule φt : B → C is defined by:
φ1(a) =
{
a− 1 if 0 < a ∈ B
a+ 1 if 0 > a ∈ B ,
and
φt(a) = φ1(a)− 4(t− 1) if t > 1 .
The following table describes this matching process where the even agents in the first row
are paired to odd agents (directly below them) in periods t = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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t · · · -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 2 4 6 8 10 12 · · ·
1 · · · -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 · · ·
2 · · · -15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 · · ·
3 · · · -19 -17 -15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 · · ·
4 · · · -23 -21 -19 -17 -15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 · · ·
It is a routine matter to verify that Φ is weakly anonymous. By Lemma 10, it is also
anonymous. It is not strongly anonymous since the Townsend’s Turnpike model allows for
indirect links among agents. To see why, consider the first three periods. In t = 1 agent
−4 meets −3. In t = 2 agent −7 meets −4, while −3 meets 2. In t = 3 agents 2 and −7
meet and both have links (direct or indirect) to agent −4. In terms of the formalization
we have earlier developed:
Π2(2) = Π1(2) ∪Π1
(
φ2(2)
)
= Π0(2) ∪Π0
(
φ1(2)
) ∪Π0(φ2(2)) ∪Π0(φ1(φ2(2)))
= P0(2) ∪ P0(1) ∪ P0(−3) ∪ P0(−4)
= {2} ∪ {1} ∪ {−3} ∪ {−4} = {−4,−3, 1, 2} ,
and
Π2(φ3(2)) = Π2(−7) = Π1(−7) ∪Π1
(
φ2(−7)
)
= Π0(−7) ∪Π0
(
φ1(−7)
) ∪Π0(φ2(−7)) ∪Π0(φ1(φ2(−7)))
= P0(−7) ∪ P0(−8) ∪ P0(−4) ∪ P0(−3)
= {−7} ∪ {−8} ∪ {−4} ∪ {−3} = {−8,−7,−4,−3} .
Thus, Π2(2) ∩Π2(φ3(2)) = {−3,−4} 6= 6©, hence Φ is not strongly anonymous.
5 The Mathematics of Anonymous Matchings
In this section, we demonstrate how to construct economies with complete informational
isolation, given any infinite population X.
It is obvious that one can always introduce enough anonymity in an economy by having
agents face a finite sequence of matches. One can simply pair agents to someone else for
only a limited number of dates, after which the agents are left permanently unmatched.
Such a scheme effectively represents the overlapping generations model of Samuelson [24].
That model can be thought of as one of an infinitely-lived economy with an infinite pop-
ulation X. Then, we can let X =
⊔∞
n=1An for n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where An have identical
cardinality, and adopt this matching process. Every agent in An for n = 1, 2, . . . is paired
to an agent in An−1 in dates t = n and to an agent An+1 in date t = n + 1. In all other
dates, the agents in An are unmatched.
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Achieving strong anonymity when agents face an infinite sequence of meetings is sub-
stantially more complicated. It requires a completely different matching process, which we
now discuss. We start by choosing an initial countable partition X =
⊔∞
n=1An of X such
that all the An have the same cardinality. Based on this initial partition, we construct
recursively a sequence of “matching blocks” for each period as shown in the following
table. (The square brackets indicate the partition sets in each period.)
Period Partition of the population X
0 X = [A1] unionsq [A2] unionsq [A3] unionsq [A4] unionsq [A5] unionsq [A6] unionsq · · ·
1 X =
[
A1 unionsqA2
] unionsq [A3 unionsqA4] unionsq [A5 unionsqA6] unionsq · · ·
2 X =
[
A1 unionsqA2 unionsqA3 unionsqA4
] unionsq [A5 unionsqA6 unionsqA7 unionsqA8] unionsq · · ·
3 X =
[
A1 unionsqA2 unionsqA3 unionsqA4 unionsqA5 unionsqA6 unionsqA7 unionsqA8
] unionsq [A9 unionsq · · ·A16] unionsq · · ·
...
... (z)
t X =
∞⊔
n=1
[
A(n−1)2t+1 unionsqA(n−1)2t+2 unionsq · · · unionsqAn2t
]
=
∞⊔
n=1
2t⊔
k=1
A(n−1)2t+k
=
∞⊔
n=1
Btn =
[
Bt1 unionsqBt2
] unionsq [Bt3 unionsqBt4] unionsq · · ·
=
∞⊔
n=1
[
Bt2n−1 unionsqBt2n
]
=
∞⊔
n=1
Bt+1n
... .
Notice that we let Btn =
⊔2t
k=1A(n−1)2t+k. These pairwise disjoint sets that have all
the same cardinality will be used to construct the matchings blocks in period t. Precisely,
a matching block in period t is any set of agents of the form
Bt+1n = B
t
2n−1 unionsqBt2n .
Given these matching blocks, we can define a strongly anonymous matching process
Φ on the population X. The idea is to construct a sequence of matching rules on each
matching block Bt+1n by pairing each agent in B
t
2n−1 to an agent in Bt2n. This can be
extended to a matching rule for the entire population, as follows.
For each n ≥ 1 and each t ≥ 1, let f tn : Bt2n−1 → Bt2n be a one-to-one and surjective
function. Also, let (f tn)
−1 : Bt2n → Bt2n−1 be the inverse of f tn. Clearly, the function
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φt,n : B
t+1
n → Bt+1n defined by
φt,n(x) =
{
f tn(x) if x ∈ Bt2n−1
(f tn)
−1(x) if x ∈ Bt2n
(†)
is an involution on Bt+1n . Next, for each t ≥ 1 we define a matching rule φt : X → X as
follows: If x ∈ X choose the unique n such that x ∈ Bt+1n and then let φt(x) = φt,n(x).
This gives rise to the matching process Φ = (φ0, φ1, φ2, . . .), where φ0 = I.
Definition 11. Any matching process Φ on X that is obtained from (z) and the preceding
procedure will be referred to as a block recursive matching process on X.
Clearly, for each t ≥ 1 the function φt : X → X is an exhaustive matching rule on
X. Moreover, from Bt+1n = B
t
2n−1 unionsq Bt2n and the definition of φt,n given in (†), it follows
that φt(B
t+1
n ) = B
t+1
n . This implies that for each n the set B
t+1
n is φt-invariant, i.e.,
φt(B
t+1
n ) ⊆ Bt+1n . More generally, we have the following.
Lemma 12. For each t ≥ 0 and each τ = 0, 1, . . . , t the sets Bt+1n , n ≥ 1 , are φτ -
invariant.
Proof. We shall use induction on t. For t = 0 the conclusion is obvious. Therefore, for
the induction step, assume that the conclusion is true for some t ≥ 0. For each n we
have Bt+2n = B
t+1
2n−1 unionsq Bt+12n and by our induction hypothesis for each i = 1, . . . , t the
functions φi : B
t+1
2n−1 → Bt+12n−1 and φi : Bt+12n → Bt+12n are exhaustive bilateral matching
rules. It easily follows that for each i = 1, . . . , t the function φi : B
t+2
n → Bt+2n is itself an
exhaustive bilateral matching rule on the set Bt+2n . Also, by the discussion preceding the
lemma we have φt+1(B
t+2
n ) ⊆ Bt+2n . This completes the induction and the proof of the
lemma.
The invariance under φτ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ t of the sets of agents Bt+1n is the essential
property in achieving strong anonymity. It guarantees that, at each date t, the matching
technology pairs the agents in Btn to those in X \ Btn. This implies two basic properties.
First, all prior partners of any agent in Btn remain in this set. Second, at date t agents
in Btn are matched to agents outside of B
t
n. In particular, it follows that matched agents
cannot share common or indirect partners, i.e, they are informationally isolated. These
properties are formalized below.
Theorem 13. Any block recursive matching process is strongly anonymous.
Proof. Let a ∈ X be an arbitrary agent and fix t ≥ 1. Let k be the unique natural
number such that a ∈ Bt+1k . According to Lemma 12, we have φi(a) ∈ Bt+1k for each
i = 0, 1, . . . , t. This easily implies Πt(a) ⊆ Bt+1k . Now according to the definition of the
bilateral matching rule φt+1 either we have b = φt+1(a) ∈ Bt+1k−1 or b = φt+1(a) ∈ Bt+1k+1.
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In particular, as above, either Πt(b) ⊆ Bt+1k−1 or Πt(b) ⊆ Bt+1k+1. Since Bt+1k−1 ∩ Bt+1k = 6©,
Bt+1k+1 ∩ Bt+1k = 6© and Πt(a) ⊆ Bt+1k , we infer that Πt(a) ∩ Πt(b) = 6©. Consequently,
(φ0, φ1, φ2, . . .) is a strongly anonymous bilateral matching process.
To sum up, the first step in constructing an infinite sequence of strongly anonymous
matchings on an infinite population X is to specify a countable partition of X. The
partition must be such that all sets of the partition have the same cardinality. For example,
consider:
X = (0, 1] =
∞⊔
n=1
(
1
n+1 ,
1
n
]
X = N = {1, 2, . . .} =
∞⊔
n=1
{n}
X = N = {1, 2, . . .} =
∞⊔
n=1
{2n− 1, 2n}
X = [0,∞) =
∞⊔
n=1
[n− 1, n) .
Having specified an initial partition, the second step is to construct matching blocks
recursively, as in (z), taking care to match agents as in (†). For example, suppose X = N
and we choose the partition X = N =
⊔∞
n=1{n}. Then, a block recursive matching process
corresponds to the matrix shown below (it describes how the even agents, in the first row,
are paired to odd agents in periods t = 1, 2, 3, 4).
t 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 · · ·
1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 · · ·
2 5 7 1 3 13 15 9 11 21 23 · · ·
3 9 11 13 15 1 3 5 7 25 27 · · ·
4 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 1 3 · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
... · · ·
In this case consider n = 1, 2 and periods t = 0, 1, 2. Then, in t = 0 we have B01 = {2},
and B02 = {4}. In t = 1 we have B11 = B01 unionsq B02 = {2, 4}, B12 = B03 unionsq B04 = {1, 3} and
φ1,1(x) : B
1
1 → B12 . In t = 2, B21 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, B22 = {5, 6, 7, 8} and φ2,1(x) : B21 → B22 .
Thus, we see that agent 2 and her partners have nothing in common at dates t = 1, 2.
We note that it is also easy to construct non-exhaustive matching processes that are
strongly anonymous. We only need to modify the construction of the block recursive
matching process, as follows. For each t ≥ 1 and each n ≥ 1 let F t2n and F t2n−1 be
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(possibly empty) subsets of Bt2n and B
t
2n−1 respectively having the same cardinality. Then,
let f tn : B
t
2n−1\ F t2n−1 → Bt2n\ F t2n be a one-to-one and surjective function, and let (f tn)−1
be its inverse. Finally, define
φt,n(x) =

x if x ∈ F t2n−1 ∪ F t2n
f tn(x) if x ∈ Bt2n\ F t2n
(f tn)
−1(x) if x ∈ Bt2n−1\ F t2n−1 ,
and then apply the same procedures used above.
6 Concluding remarks
We have taken a step toward developing a theoretical foundation for economic frameworks
where agents interact via some exogenous matching process. We have laid the groundwork
by formalizing—via an explicit set-theoretic representation—the method of operation of
technologies that generate deterministic pairings. This has allowed us to chart a method
by which different meeting processes can facilitate or obstruct the exchange of economic
resources and, in particular, of information. We have also introduced a general approach
of how to construct environments, where a technology used to pair agents infinitely often
imposes severe constraints on the interactions among agents. The matching framework we
have presented can contribute to provide more solid mathematical foundations for general
classes of matching processes as in our companion paper [2].
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